XI. XV. Some features of WorldCat will not be available. The third cause is, that we become fatigued by attending tothose objects which are not present to the senses; and that we arethus accustomed to judge of these not from present perception butfrom pre-conceived opinion. In the same way, when we consider a figure of three sides,we form a certain idea, which we call the idea of a triangle, and weafterwards make use of it as the universal to represent to our mindall other figures of three sides. WorldCat is the world's largest library catalog, helping you find library materials online. Produced by Steve Harris, Charles Franksand the Online Distributed Proofreading Team. LXV. : Distributed by Kluwer Boston, ©1983. Don't have an account? And if they did discover any truth, this was due to one orother of the four means above mentioned. The brutes, whichhave only their bodies to conserve, are continually occupied inseeking sources of nourishment; but men, of whom the chief part isthe mind, ought to make the search after wisdom their principalcare, for wisdom is the true nourishment of the mind; and I feelassured, moreover, that there are very many who would not fail inthe search, if they would but hope for success in it, and knew thedegree of their capabilities for it. In theDioptrics, I designed to show that we might proceed far enough inphilosophy as to arrive, by its means, at the knowledge of the artsthat are useful to life, because the invention of the telescope, ofwhich I there gave an explanation, is one of the most difficult thathas ever been made. There is no mind, how ignoblesoever it be, which remains so firmly bound up in the objects of thesenses, as not sometime or other to turn itself away from them inthe aspiration after some higher good, although not knowingfrequently wherein that good consists. The only apprehension I entertain is lest the titleshould deter some who have not been brought up to letters, or withwhom philosophy is in bad repute, because the kind they were taughthas proved unsatisfactory; and this makes me think that it will beuseful to add a preface to it for the purpose of showing what theMATTER of the work is, what END I had in view in writing it, andwhat UTILITY may be derived from it. http:\/\/www.worldcat.org\/title\/-\/oclc\/18520575#CreativeWork\/unidentifiedOriginalWork> ; http:\/\/experiment.worldcat.org\/entity\/work\/data\/3376645325#Place\/lewiston_n_y_usa> ; http:\/\/id.loc.gov\/vocabulary\/countries\/nyu> ; http:\/\/experiment.worldcat.org\/entity\/work\/data\/3376645325#Topic\/quelle> ; http:\/\/experiment.worldcat.org\/entity\/work\/data\/3376645325#Topic\/naturphilosophie> ; http:\/\/experiment.worldcat.org\/entity\/work\/data\/3376645325#Topic\/naturwissenschaften> ; http:\/\/dewey.info\/class\/194\/e19\/> ; http:\/\/id.loc.gov\/authorities\/classification\/B1863> ; http:\/\/experiment.worldcat.org\/entity\/work\/data\/3376645325#Topic\/erkenntnis> ; http:\/\/id.worldcat.org\/fast\/1060777> ; http:\/\/experiment.worldcat.org\/entity\/work\/data\/3376645325#Event\/geschichte_1647> ; http:\/\/experiment.worldcat.org\/entity\/work\/data\/3376645325#Thing\/philosophy> ; http:\/\/worldcat.org\/entity\/work\/id\/3376645325> ; http:\/\/experiment.worldcat.org\/entity\/work\/data\/3376645325#Series\/studies_in_the_history_of_philosophy_lewiston_n_y> ; http:\/\/experiment.worldcat.org\/entity\/work\/data\/3376645325#Series\/studies_in_the_history_of_philosophy> ; http:\/\/www.worldcat.org\/oclc\/795313463> ; http:\/\/www.worldcat.org\/title\/-\/oclc\/18520575#PublicationEvent\/lewiston_n_y_usa_e_mellen_press_1988> ; http:\/\/experiment.worldcat.org\/entity\/work\/data\/3376645325#Agent\/e_mellen_press> ; http:\/\/worldcat.org\/isbn\/9780889463080> ; http:\/\/worldcat.org\/isbn\/9780889463004> ; http:\/\/bnb.data.bl.uk\/id\/resource\/GB9042463> ; http:\/\/www.worldcat.org\/title\/-\/oclc\/18520575> ; http:\/\/experiment.worldcat.org\/entity\/work\/data\/3376645325#Agent\/e_mellen_press>, http:\/\/experiment.worldcat.org\/entity\/work\/data\/3376645325#Event\/geschichte_1647>, http:\/\/experiment.worldcat.org\/entity\/work\/data\/3376645325#Place\/lewiston_n_y_usa>, http:\/\/experiment.worldcat.org\/entity\/work\/data\/3376645325#Series\/studies_in_the_history_of_philosophy>. The mind will be still more certain of the truth of this conclusion,if it consider that it has no idea of any other thing in which itcan discover that necessary existence is contained; for, from thiscircumstance alone, it will discern that the idea of an all-perfectBeing has not been framed by itself, and that it does not representa chimera, but a true and immutable nature, which must exist sinceit can only be conceived as necessarily existing. AndI remark, in almost all those who are versant in Metaphysics, thatthey are wholly disinclined from Geometry; and, on the other hand,that the cultivators of Geometry have no ability for theinvestigations of the First Philosophy: insomuch that I can say withtruth I know but one mind, and that is your own, to which bothstudies are alike congenial, and which I therefore, with propriety,designate incomparable. For example, the mind has within itself ideas of numbers andfigures, and it has likewise among its common notions the principleTHAT IF EQUALS BE ADDED TO EQUALS THE WHOLES WILL BE EQUAL and thelike; from which it is easy to demonstrate that the three angles ofa triangle are equal to two right angles, etc. or as eternal truthspossessing no existence beyond our thought. For theknowledge we have of God renders it certain that he can effect allthat of which we have a distinct idea: wherefore, since we have now,for example, the idea of an extended and corporeal substance, thoughwe as yet do not know with certainty whether any such thing isreally existent, nevertheless, merely because we have the idea ofit, we may be assured that such may exist; and, if it really exists,that every part which we can determine by thought must be reallydistinct from the other parts of the same substance. It is thus manifest that to say we perceive colours in objects is inreality equivalent to saying we perceive something in objects andare yet ignorant of what it is, except as that which determines inus a certain highly vivid and clear sensation, which we call thesensation of colours. That the notions which are simplest and self-evident, areobscured by logical definitions; and that such are not to bereckoned among the cognitions acquired by study, [but as born withus]. The E-mail Address(es) field is required. There is no need that I should here say more on thissubject, since it has already received ample treatment in themetaphysical Meditations; and what follows will serve to explain itstill more accurately. And, indeed, with regard to these common notions, it is not to bedoubted that they can be clearly and distinctly known, for otherwisethey would not merit this appellation: as, in truth, some of themare not, with respect to all men, equally deserving of the name,because they are not equally admitted by all: not, however, fromthis reason, as I think, that the faculty of knowledge of one manextends farther than that of another, but rather because thesecommon notions are opposed to the prejudices of some, who, on thisaccount, are not able readily to embrace them, even although others,who are free from those prejudices, apprehend them with the greatestclearness.
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